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ROLES OF STATES/ PROVINCES IN TAXATION IN THE
CANADA/ U.S. CONTEXT
Walter Hellerstein

Thank you for those kind words. It is a great honor to be here. At the
outset, in the interest of truth- in- advertising, I should make it clear that my
knowledge of the topic I am addressing is very one-sided. I know about state
taxation in the United States, but I know considerably less about the
Canadian side. The exposure I have had to what Canada has been doing has
primarily been in connection with my participation in the work of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) with
regard to consumption taxation of electronic commerce. The U.S. has
consumption sub-national taxes, i.e., our retail sales tax, and that is the only
broad-based consumption tax we have. Most of rest of the world, including
Canada, has a national Value Added Tax (VAT) or consumption tax. One of
the very interesting aspects of the relation between sub-national jurisdictions
and taxes is that suddenly, with the growth of electronic commerce and the
pressure on governments around the world to try and figure out how to try to
administer taxes in a digital world, sub-national jurisdictions understand that
these problems are truly global. The problems we have in Ohio, Georgia, or
Michigan, are precisely the same problems that the OECD countries have.
While my focus will be on U.S. specifics, I believe that what I have to
say is relevant to the Canadian situation because I will focus on what
happens when we start to have cross border transactions in the international
context and the sources of friction created by sub-national governments in
the tax arena.
I believe there are three structural sources of friction that arise out of subnational taxing power in a federal system.
The first source of friction is the existence of different rules at the
national and sub-national level. For example, if you have a different
substantive rule as to what creates a sufficient establishment or nexus in
order to tax, you are going to have a problem with the administration of
inconsistent jurisdictional rules.
The second source of friction is different restraints on sub-national and
national behavior. Now, these first two points overlap, but they are different.
Hellerstein bio.
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Let me explain. You can have different sub-national and national rules,
which may well be an irritant, but they may not offend any norm of
international behavior. You can also have the same rule nationally and subnationally, for example, a rule that allegedly discriminates against crossborder transactions for e-commerce, but you might have a restraint at the
international level, e.g., a restraint involving national treatment that does not
apply at the sub-national level. These are two analytically different sources
of friction, although they do overlap.
The third source of friction is that there tend to be more sub-national
governments than national governments.
The mere existence of a
multiplicity of rules itself causes friction.
Those are three sources of friction on which I want to focus.
At the outset I wish to make a few general points that will inform the
balance of my discussion. Some of these points were certainly implicit, if
not explicit, in the previous presentations.
First, the states have broad autonomy in the tax area, at least with respect
to general revenue- raising measures that are not directed at specific
substantive policies. Assuming that a tax is relatively neutral, states are
generally allowed to go in their own direction even if they choose a different
means of raising revenue than those adopted by the federal government.
There is more deference given to fiscal legislation than any other under the
U.S. system.
Second, when you consider the states vis- a- vis cross-border transactions
in the U.S. context, it really makes no difference whether the out-of-state
enterprise is from another state or from another country. From the state
standpoint, these are all out-of-state enterprises. It is clear under the U.S.
Constitution that if a state were to accord different treatment, either less
favorable or more favorable, to the foreign cross-border transaction than to
the internal, cross-border or interstate transaction, the state would run into
constitutional trouble. Certainly, if a state were to disfavor a transaction
involving a sale by a Canadian company into the state as distinguished from
a sale by an American company into the state, that would violate the Foreign
Commerce Clause. By the same token, if the state were to favor foreign over
domestic cross-border commerce, there are decisions out of California courts
saying that favoring foreign over interstate commerce violates the Interstate
Commerce Clause.
One thing I should say at this point is that when I talk about the
Commerce Clause, I am not talking about it the way Professor Farber and
others have talked about it. They have been focusing on what Congress can
do. I am focusing to a large extent on the so-called negative restraints that
exist on what sub-national governments can do simply because the
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Commerce Clause exists. In other words, the general doctrine in the U.S. is
that the affirmative grant of power to Congress to regulate interstate
commerce carries with it certain negative implications. Even though there is
no broad-based congressional statute that says states may not disfavor
foreign or out-of-state commerce, states may not discriminate against foreign
commerce or, indeed, against interstate commerce under the negative
Commerce Clause restraints on state taxing power. These are entirely based
on judicial doctrine. There are some federal statutes that do limit state tax
power, but they are relatively few and far between.
Let me then identify several of what I call substantive areas in which we
have friction because of the problems I mentioned; the different national and
sub-national rules; the different restraints on national, as distinguished from
sub-national, rules; and the multiplicity of rules. Then I would like to talk
about a few areas where there has been friction and how we resolved those
frictions. The recurring question is whether national or international norms
trump sub-national norms or whether sub-national autonomy prevails.
Let us start with the question of jurisdiction of tax. The question is
whether there is sufficient presence in a jurisdiction in order to allow that
jurisdiction to exercise its tax power.
Here I have to make a distinction with which U.S. observers sometimes
are unfamiliar, namely the distinction between direct taxes and indirect taxes.
The U.S. income tax is a direct tax. U.S. sales and use taxes are indirect
taxes corresponding to the Canadian Goods and Services Tax (GST).
At the direct tax level there is an international jurisdictional standard
because most of the developed world has tax treaties. Those tax treaties
generally say that an out-of-state enterprise is not subject to the jurisdiction
of the taxing authority unless it has a permanent establishment. A permanent
establishment is a store, a warehouse, or something physical. Right now, one
of the burning debates in the area of e-commerce is whether a server
If you have a permanent
constitutes a permanent establishment.
establishment in a state, then you are subject to income tax jurisdiction there.
That is the international norm that applies in both the U.S. and Canada.
Direct tax treaties do not govern sub-national governments.
In the U.S., the question whether an enterprise is subject to tax at the subnational level does not depend on whether it has a permanent establishment
in that state- the international norm. Rather, it depends on whether there is
nexus under the negative implications of the Commerce Clause and under the
Due Process Clause, which has also been read as imposing a jurisdictional or
territorial limitation on state taxing authority. The basic notion is that if you
do not have a sufficient connection with someone, then you cannot exercise
your fiscal power over that someone. These are very vague terms and have
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been interpreted in many different ways in many different states. For
example, right now there is an ongoing debate as to whether one needs to
have physical presence in a state in order for a state to impose a direct tax.
This is a no-brainer from the standpoint of national rules. The state cannot
impose a direct tax because you do not have a permanent establishment.
However, the Supreme Court of South Carolina has held intangible presence
is sufficient to establish jurisdiction to impose a direct tax, because, under the
Due Process Clause and Commerce Clause, it is enough.
There is some friction with respect to jurisdictional issues between
Canada and the U.S. I have two Canada/ U.S. examples.
The first example is the single business tax. The single business tax is
odd. It is supposedly a VAT, a value added tax, but it is imposed on business
activity, like a direct business income tax. It has nothing to do with
consumption, and should not be confused with a VAT that we have in OECD
and most other countries in the world. The U.S. is the only major country
without a national VAT.
Michigan has a single business tax. What is the standard for determining
whether Michigan can impose a tax on Canadian truckers? The truckers do
not have a permanent establishment in Michigan, but they do have nexus
because they are physically present in Michigan. That is enough under our
constitutional system, although not under international treaties. This has
created friction. In the end, the friction was resolved through an informal
process whereby Michigan was persuaded to conform to the national norm
and to say, in effect, "If truckers do not have a permanent establishment in
Michigan, then we will not assert our taxing power." In short, Michigan has
the power, under our Constitution, to impose a direct tax on in state trucking
activity, but assertion of that power would not be consistent with the
international norm. In this instance, at least, the international norm
prevailed.
Let me turn next to jurisdiction-to-tax issues regarding indirect taxes.
What is interesting about indirect taxes is that, in contrast to direct taxes,
there is no treaty system where the world generally agrees that you have to
have a permanent establishment to be subject to tax obligations. While there
is no treaty system, there are, nevertheless, international norms. These norms
generally require some kind of presence or fixed establishment, but the
standards are not identical from country to country. With regard to this issue
on the U.S. side, the U.S. Supreme Court has weighed in. The U.S. Supreme
Court has told the states, in effect, that unless the remote vendor has a
physical presence within the state, it cannot be required to collect the indirect
tax. As a practical matter, the only way to collect indirect taxes is if someone
collects them other than the ultimate consumer, when that consumer is a
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private person. The problem is simply multiplicity of rules. What is the rule
for sufficient jurisdiction? Someone may say three visits is enough; someone
else might say three visits is not enough. There the source of the irritant is
not so much the difference between national and sub-national rules as the
idea that every state decides for itself until the U.S. Supreme Court says,
"Well, here is one safe harbor." That is just one case. It does not resolve this
issue for many other contexts.
Let me turn to another issue where the same sources of friction arise.
That area is discrimination.
Again, we have a national norm for
discrimination in the sense that our treaties have a norm of nondiscrimination; and, in the indirect tax area, as well as the direct tax area,
some of our trade agreements also have a national treatment norm.
I think here I need to refer to Mr. Farber who has written an excellent
article, A GATT's Eye View Of The Dormant Commerce Clause, which
really goes through the relationship between these worlds, between the trade
agreements and the Dormant Commerce Clause. Let me say that when you
look at the differences here from the state standpoint, the kind of
discrimination in which they think they can engage, notwithstanding the
Commerce Clause, there is a real conflict. Take, for example, the beer cases,
where we have all kinds of exemptions for small brewers who are using instate products. That would be regarded, I think, as perfectly acceptable under
U.S. sub-national law, but not acceptable under a national treatment standard.
The question is whether or not those national treatment standards can be
imposed sub-nationally, unlike tax treaties. The question is whether those
standards do, in fact, apply to the states. Here is one example of a situation
where the national norm should trump the different sub-national approach.
The second Canada/ U.S. example has to do with so-called run away film
companies. The U.S. is complaining about how Hollywood is leaving the
United States for Canada. Apparently, this is an issue because the Canadian
provinces are trying to attract industry by tax incentives. Of course, this is
what we do everyday. The last time I saw Mr. Farber, we were at a
conference and we were having a conversation about this "race to the
bottom," where states are fighting each other to see who can provide a bigger
tax abatement to get the next sports stadium.
The last time I saw Mr. Schaefer, we were at a European conference on
state aid control. State aid control is about controlling subsidies that states
provide for their own business. Under the Treaty of Rome, there are

Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatory State: A
GATT's-Eye View of the DormantCommerce Clause, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1401 (1994).
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restraints on the extent to which states can provide such subsidies.2 The U.S.
has no restraints on what can be done nationally or sub-nationally, with the
exception, of course, of the fact that we are members of the OECD and have
signed the World Trade Agreement. So when we do something at the
national level, like a domestic international sales corporation, we get
reprimanded. There are some limitations at the national level, but at the subnational level there are virtually no limitations at all.
Let me turn now to the questions: what kinds of cases have we had, how
have the conflicts been resolved, and why?
Let me turn to an example. There was an international convention on
containers that the U.S. signed in which the U.S. agreed that, on the national
level, it will allow only the home state, the state where the container has been
registered or where the owner resides, to tax the container. California
imposed a tax that would have been perfectly good under our sub-national,
Dormant Commerce Clause norms. The tax was not discriminatory. The tax
was fairly apportioned. It was a fair tax. However, the argument was that
this sub-national tax violated international norms because the U.S. has signed
a treaty with Japan. This is one of the rare instances where, in fact, the U.S.
Supreme Court said, "The states cannot do this." 3 Why? It was not as if the
state was preempted by explicit congressional legislation. It was the negative
implication of the Dormant Commerce Clause and the thought that the
federal government must speak with one voice when dealing with foreign
affairs. The Court struck down the tax.
This negative Commerce Clause doctrine might have been expanded to
cut a broad swath through the state tax field to get rid of all these subnational taxes that violate international norms. Of course, that has not
happened. What has happened?
Take a look at the two of the most infamous cases that relate to the same
problem, but in the context of income taxes rather than property taxes. As
many of you know, the states have their own way of deciding what portion of
a unitary group of corporations' income the state is entitled to tax when any
member of that group is engaged in activity within and without the state.
The international norm is to say, "If a subsidiary of Barclay's Bank is doing
business in the U.S, we will determine the subsidiary's income by figuring
how much of the subsidiary- viewed as an independent enterprise- earned in
the U.S. based on its own activity in the U.S."

of Rome (1957) (now Treaty Establishing the European Community) was the
establishment of a single market allowing the free circulation of goods, services, capital and
persons between the countries of the European Union.
3Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 939
(1979).
2Treaty
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The states do it differently. If one member of an affiliated group is doing
business in the state and that member of the affiliated group has close
economic interrelationships with other members of the affiliated group, the
states put all the affiliates together and create one big pie of income. The
way we determine the right slice that the state can take is by a formula. It is
a method of determining the right slice the state can take when one does not
really know where income is earned and, given the problems of tax
avoidance and limitations on jurisdiction, the states do not want to be in the
business of monitoring transfer prices. This is the so-called 'unitary' method
of taxation or, more accurately, world wide combined reporting. This had
the world up in arms.
Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court, when it first considered a case
involving the question whether California could impose this world wide
unitary apportionment scheme on a corporation with a state based multinational business said, "As long as there is no explicit federal directive
prescribing otherwise, the mere fact that we do it one way at the federal
level, does not mean that we may not do it a different way at the state level."4
How did the Court distinguish the property case? The Court observed
that concurrent taxation of income is a well-established norm. Moreover,
who knows where income is earned, that is, the Court said, "It is like slicing
a shadow."
By contrast, we know where the property is located.
Furthermore, the container convention was a more explicit statement of
federal policy than simply being a member of OECD. That point was
essentially reiterated several years ago in the Barclays case in 1994.5 In the
Barclays case, the Court said the same thing in an even more sensitive
context because there was a foreign multinational. Again, one can see
sources of friction.
Let me just end then with one other case where Florida imposed a tax on
the sale of fuel to airlines.6 There was nothing wrong with the tax. It was a
typical sales tax. The U.S. signed an agreement with Canada and many other
countries in which it was agreed that that airline fuel taxes would be imposed
only by the state from which the carrier originates. The Court once again
held that the agreement did not preempt state regulation because the
provision did not explicitly bind the states. These national agreements do not
bind sub-national jurisdictions, except in very unusual circumstances. The
Court said, "Look, Congress did not say anything about this. Indeed, by
excluding states from this prohibition, Congress presumably approved this."

4 Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994).
5

Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983).

6 Wardair Canada Inc. v. Florida Department of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1 (1986).
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